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A POSSIBLE READING OF "THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS"
Sandipto Dasgupta*'
Before the Reading
This paper, very simply put, is an attempted subversive reading of an influential text on how judges
reach a decision- The Nature of the JudidalProcess,which took shape as a series of lectures delivered
by Benjamin N. Cardozo at the Yale Law School in 1921. However, before the commencement of the
process, there is a need for a more formal introduction to the author, the text and the reading

technique.
A. About Cardozo
\Yhen he was delivering this set of lectures at Yale, Cardozo was probably the most highly respected
judge of one of the most highly respected courts in America at that time: the Court of Appeals of

the State of New York. In later years, his career reached further heights with his nomination to the
Supreme Court by President Hoover in 1932, where he served for a period of six years.
Most scholars have seen the earlier years rather than the Supreme Court period as the period marking
Cardozo's most important contributions to law. Indeed, Cardozos fame certainly derives from his
years in the New York Court of Appeals. His major contributions to law, the development of his
approach to judging, and his writings about the judicial process and techniques all dare to this pan of
his ife. However, Richard Friedman believes that Cardo2o's years at the Supreme Court were also
important as they rested his theories against a constitutional framework. According to him, Cardozo
was the torchbearer of the court in the 1930s, creating legal theory on the government's power to
deal with the economic crisis, a theory which finally prevailed after 1937
Notwithstanding his claim to iconic status as a judge, what is remarkable about Cardozo is his dual
excellence as a judge and an author and it is 6tting that the present eminence of his standing rests

equally on both these abilities.

B. Why "The Nature of the Judicial Process"?
The reason for choosing The Nature of the Judicial Process is twofold - its content and its impact, In
terms of content, the central feature of Cardozo's characterisation of the judicial process is a

debunking of the then prevalent view of the oracular judge, whose role was perceived as merely
finding and pronouncing the extant law Rather, he insisted that the
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the creation of law. in the paragraph that contains the book's title, Cardozn described his own
intellectual transformation: "As the years have gone by, and as I have reflected more and more upon
the nature of the judicial process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I have grown
to see it as inievitable. I have grown to see that the process in its highest reaches is not discover, but
creation..."'
The creation of law, Cardozo insisted, entails a choice of decisions. In another of his works, he
announced that "we must spread the gospel that there is no gospel that will save us from die pain of
choosing at every step."' He added that within the gaps of the law, "choice moves with a freedom
which stamps its action as creative. The law which is the resulting product is not found, but made.
The process, being legislative, demands the legislator's wisdom."' Indeed, the prevalence of choice is
emphasized throughout his writing
The omnipresent need to make choices renders the judicial process susceptible to human fallibility.
The decision-making process is inherently human: "Deep below consciousness are other forces, the
likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and
babits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge."' In a passage that has
become famous, Cardozo added: "We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less,
we can never see them with any eyes except our own.""" Even the most scrupulously executed
decision-making process cannot escape the human element: "After the wearisome process of analysis
has been finished, there must be for every judge a new synthesis which he will have to make for
himself."" In sum, Cardozo portrayed the judicial process as embedded in an environment replete
with gaps and ambiguities. Fallible people are called on to solve these intricate, seemingly intractable
problems,, with no obvious solution waiting to be found. The making of decisions inevitably demands
the creatin of law, and the results of the process are bound to be subjecive and somewhat
imprecise.
In his drme,, when formalism ruled American courtrooms, such observations by a sitting judge were
considered radical. Llewellyn recalled that The Nature of the Jada/ Procear "shocked our legal world"'
and Polenberg described Cardozo's work as having radically subverted the conventional
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understanding of judicial decision-making. The book has also been called "a sensational event,"'
nothing less than "a legal version of hard core pornography."
It is precisely this quality that of an apparent radical character, which makes this text an interesting
reading for our purpose. The celebrated "openness" of the text allows apparent scope for the play of
binary opposites. However, I seek to establish that, openness notwithstanding, through a subder
narrative than his judicial predecessor, Cardozo still attempts to freeze the play of binary opposites in
favour of the cenrer."' It will be my endeavour to show, that Cardozo, in spire of his antiestablishmentarian image, plays on the side of the power structure of which he was a part.
The other reason for choosing this text was, as mentioned, its continuing impact. It could be fairlv
described as a watershed in the American tradition of legal writing. It heralded and paved the way for
increasingly candid and hold narratives by American judges in their unofficial capacities. The vast
majority of current academic writing about the judicial process adheres to Cardozo's basic
conceptions. Judge Kaye states that the idea that appellate decision-making is devoid of judicial
creation amounts to "intellectual nonsense."'"Judge Traynor states that today's judge is "necessarily in
active analyst and not a passive oracle." t Making judicial decisions, justice Pollock explains, is
"unavoidably creative,""' and requires "myriad choices at every step."21' Moreover, the creative
character of judging is considered by many juidges to be normatively desirable.' Therefore, Cardozo's
text is an important and influential one in the discourse of American jurisprudence, and deserves
critical understanding
However, it is interestng to note that the impact is somewhat restricted to extra-judicial witings only.
It may be a little precipitate to conclude that these depictions of openness accurately reflect the
dominant legal culture in America. A quick glance at the case law produced by courts reveals that
these statements made in a non-judicial or academic capacity fal to reflect the way the law is

Tim- WOR.D or BENJAMIN CARDrio 86 (1997)s Judge Ruggeri Aldiserr said thai in 1921, Cardcmis\
depiction of ctative judging was considered revoltionary. See, Ruggero J. Aldisert, T/k Nature of Thejudicial rocat
RIeaiikd, 49 U. iN. L. REv. 1 (19801). Judge Ald'sert is a senior eulicon judge of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
RiCHan PoU;NII.,
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Wbnt we mean by "binary opposites" and "canter" will be subsequentdy discussed.

Kaye, snpro note 15. at 14J06.
Rugerj. Traynor, The LastsoffjadiiiCreaniy,29 HArr. L J. 1023 (1978).

oJeing,71 YU. L. Ry. 591 (1996) it 593. (Hereinafter "Ilkck"). Jauice Pollock
Stewart G. Pollock, The Arteof
member (of the New Jersey Supreme Court.

is

a

Id Rt 594.

Justice Brennan stares: "Senssinvity to one's intuidive and Passionate responses, and awareness of the range if human cxperience, is theretore not only an inevitable but a degiraMe part of the judicial process, an aspect more to be nurtured than
feared.- [Wiliam J. Brenoan, Jr, Reawn, PRsaio. ad Me Paryne of tr Law, 42 Rr. As-Nv BLCrn N\ 948 (1987) at Q591.
Justice Pollock asi,: -Does anyone really want 1 udges to be devoid of imagination, good sense, courAge, and cotmpassion?"
[Pollock, sipma note 19, at 594). justice Scott asserts: "Uladges do make, are duty bound b, and are obligated under the relamndwatalic &
publian form of government, to be creative and make law- [Gregory Keliam ScorJr/Ae-Made Lnr C
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"actually' applied. As some critics have insisted, although officially pronounced dead, legal
formalism continues to dominate judicial reasoning in America. The majority of judicial opinions
actually generated in courtrooms across that country continue to sound as if discovering extant law is
the prinamry modes operandi of judging." As Posier observes, most decisions are couched in the
vocabulary of apodictic certainty."
C. Cardozo's

Judicial Philosophy- A Question of Capacities

From his non-judicial writings, Cardozo could be classified as an early realist, candid in admitting the
existence of judicial law-making and stressing on the uncertainties of the decision-making process.
Interestingly, a radically different characrerisation emerges from Cardozo's work as a judge. One of
the most notable features of Cardozo's opinions is their distinct sense of obvious correctnessi His
reasoning is typically cast in the mould of formalism, following established doctrines as a matter of
perceived necessity 'Even when the law is unclear, his conclusions appear legitimate and compelling.
Cardozo' opinions rarely left unresolved issues in their wake. Friend and former clerk Joseph Raub
said that in arriving at his decision, Cardozo would "explore and explode the obstructions which
stood in the way of the fair result."' Learned Hand stated that Cardozoi opinions had an "unerring
accuracy.""'j Lkewclyn was of the belief that "no judge has ever had a stronger urge to leave an
opinion in clean harmony with the authorities.""
In his recent authoritative biography, Andrew Kaufman takes a different position?' Much of
Kaufman's work is devoted to warding off the charge that Cardozos judicial decisions were resultoriented rather than principle-driven. In this vein, Kaufman combed through a mass of Cardozo's
judicial opinions to show that Cardozo's results were principled and consistent. While acknowledging
Cardozo's occasional misjudgnent, Kaufman concludes convincingly that his decisions were not
exceptionally result-oriented. Kaufman also goes to great lengths to defend Cardozo from the

NEi.o DiuxiuRY, PAn IRsn*AMERICINJURISPRUDENCi 176 (1996).
See, Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Cradfi La/Doine 69 S. CAT. L Rrv. 1989 (19%).
See. Dtn Simon, A Pyc4loraMark/of ]ndiao/Rasonin, 30 RUTGERS L. J, (I 998) at 15,
RI.HAD A. P is ER, LkW AND LEGA THnoRY INUS. AND THE U.K. 45 (1996).
H.V. Evaiin desribed Caro as one who "was able to reconstruct the concrete factual situation existing at a time long
past and to do rWilin such a way that his legal conclusions appeared almoSt inevitable." [H.V Evart, Mr.-Justir Cardoo 39
Coiumi. L. Rfv. 5 (1939)j.
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allegation that his decisions relied too heavily on incomprehensive reasoning and skewed renditions
of factual bases. Here, however, Kaufman's success is incomplete?
This apparent contradiction will form an interesting backdrop when we try to
in Cardozo's reasonings.

locate the focal points

D. Attermpting a Subversive Reading
Subversive reading, the technique that I propose to employ in reading the given text, is partly based
on deconstruction, as made famous by Jacques Derrida. According to Derrida, all western thought is
based on the idea of a center, which can be broadly defined as an essence, a presence which
guarantees all meaning," For example, in pre-enlighteniment western culture, the center was
Christianity and Christ. In Rousseau's philosophy, the center was Nature. Centers are characterised
by their attempt to exclude. In doing so, they ignore, repress or marginalise others (which becomes
the other). For example, in a culture where Christ is the center, all others, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists
anybody different - will become the other, and will in turn be repressed, ignored and pushed to thu
margins.
This phenomenon has an interesting result. The longing (or the struggle) for the center spawns
"binary opposites", with one terminus at the opposite marginal and one centrally located. What power
attempts to do is freeze the free play of these binary opposites. How exactly is this done? According
to Derrida, we have no access to reality except through concepts, codes and categories, and the
human mind functions by conceptual pairs such as these Certain codes or texts try to tell us that
what is at the center is the only reality- For example, a Christian icon is an attempt to freeze the plax
between the binary Christ/ pagan. The pagan (or any other) is not represented in that drawing and is
thereby repressed and marginalised. One member of the binary pair (the center) is thus privileged
over the other.
This is exactly what deconstruction aims to address. Deconstruction, at the risk of attempting a
definition, is a way of reading that concerns itself with de-centering-with unmasking the
problematic nature of all centers. It basically attempts to ensure the free play of the binary opposites.
Deconstrucrion does this in three major steps. Firstly, the center is identified. Secondly, the center is
subverted, that is, the margin is made the center and vice versa. But this stage, called subversion, is
supposed to be momentary in deconstruction proper. This is because otherwise the earlier margin
(and the new center) will become the new source of power and the essential problem will remaim
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Therefore, the all important third step basically ensures that no meaning can be fixed through which
one of the binary opposites can claim privilege over the other, thereby maintaining the free play of
the opposites.
Our way of reading is based on the first two steps. We attempt to identify the centers in Cardozo's
text and thereafter attempt to subvert them through counter arguments, through which we attempt to
privilege the marginal other However, we stop at that in this paper. In that sense this paper does have
an unfinished deconstructive agenda.
I feel that subversion achieves an important political purpose because of the nature of the text that we
are reading. It was authored by one of the iconic figures of the United States Supreme Court; is
generally acknowledged to he a "classic" and it contains the mix of a half-ashamed formalism and early
realism - the two most powerful jurisprudential schools which influence judges even today. All these
indicate that the text is one which commands a position of power and dominance. Therefore, even a
mere act of subvcrsion will serve the important function of what Foucault called "sabotaging the
designs of power" or less ambitiously, of merely raising a voice of dissent against the dominant thinking
on this subject.

The Reading
A. The Technique: The Spirit of Science
However, before we engage ourselves with the task of identifying some of the centers, it will be
interesting to take a glance at the method that Cardozo uses to make his case and freeze the play of
the binary opposites. Throughout his work Cardozo has attempted, rather successfully, to achieve the
aura of a "scientific" enquiry into the workings of the process of judging. The decision-making
process is dissected into four seemingly neat categories, or "forces" as he called them.
First of all, Cardozo suggested, that at least ninety percent of the cases that judges decide do not call
for th exercise of much creativity on the part of the judged As regards the remaining fraction - the
famous "hard" cases - Cardozo suggested that a quadripartite division of the forces are obeyed in the
decision-making process. As he put it: "Our fourfold division separates the force of logic or analogy,
which gives us the method of philosophy () the force of history, which gives us the historical
method, or the method of evolution; the force of custom, which yields the method of tradition; and
the force of justice, morals and social welfare, the mores of the day, with its outlet or expression in
the method of sociology."'
Thereafter, Cardozo attempts to delineate the proper scope and applications of each of these forces.
He also tries to locate several areas of law in which one of these four forces takes precedence over
the others. Although it is likely that Cardozo was well aware of the essential problem of trying to fit
somerthing as arbitrary as judicial decision-making into neat categories," this was nevertheless a brave

CAutVO, supra note

5,

at 143. It is this statement of Cardozo which certain scholars draw attention to when thev stlte

that lie exhibited certnin traits of formalism,
CARDOZo, spm note 5, at 32.
To be fair to Cardozo, lie had issued rather cautious reminders in several parts of his work regarding the overall vulnerhelry of his model and its suscepubility to the vagaries of the judicial process. However, what we are on is not whether he snr-

ce.rfidb categorised judicial decision-making but the process he undertook in attempting to do so,
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attempt to use the methods of scientific enquiry, one of the cornerstones of the enlightenment's
discursive technique. This bold effort at a broad classification might also have been the primary
reason for Cardozo's popularity among his contemporaries and followers, who formed integral parts
of the same project.
B. The Centers
i. Truth
The first center I deal with is that of "truth". One can locate it in Cardozo's exposition of the first
of his four forces-the "method of philosophy". He believes the merit of this method lies in
governing the "affairs of men with the serene and impartial uniformity which is of the essence of the
idea of law"' and it will help shape "great and shining truths"" from the "sordid controversy of the
litigants".The strong belief that there are singular truths which all knowledge should strive for is one of the
most fundamental traits of the Modern." Cardozo does not introduce this concept into legal
discourse but he does indirectly make a case for it.41 However, he refuses to engage with the contours
of this truth, and thereby sidesteps one of the most contested spaces within the Modern. The major
ideological battles within the Modern have been fought for the control of the terrain called truth.
Often these claims were made on the basis of the "rational" or the "scientific", which were
acknowledged as the only possible way to reach the "truth". For example, Lenin's much quoted claim
for Marxism is a classic example of such a technique-"Marxism is true, because it is scientific."42
Cardozo, though ideologically far removed from Lenin, shares this fascination for truth ("shining" or
otherwise) and Aso believes in the qualities that the path should have - order, uniformity and as we
will discuss later, logic This apparent irony is the point I am attempting to make. It is highly
problematic to claim one singular truth, since it is subsequently likely to become the site of major
operation of power. Power seeks to enforce its own version of truth and in the process silences the
various other "truths" (or, as they are often named, in much less ambitious terms-opinions) So
when power imposes the "truth" that "heterosexuality is natural", homosexuals become "unnatural"
and therefore "criminal" This insensitivity to the other is not uncommon in Cardozo's work.
ii. Logic

The second center which Cardozo engages in is a center common to most post-enlightenment
philosophical discourses-logic. Aware of the realist argument, Cardozo first acknowledges that a perfect
logical consistency in judicial decisions is something that is rare in practice. 3 Nevertheless, he strongly

CARDozo, Sapra note 5, at 36.
CARDozo, supra note 5, at 35.
CADUZoo,

lapma note 5, at 31

"Modern" for the purpose of this paper is the form of thought identified with the spirit and aspirations of the enlightenment. From a Modernist point of view, truth means a relation between an asserted proposition and some state of affairs
that makes the proposition "true". HILLARY PUTNAM, REPRESENTAriON AND REALiTY 115 (1978).
For more discussions on the concept of "truth" in legal philosophy, seeneralf, DENIS
NN PATTERSON, LAW AND TRTHt
(1996).
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argues for the need for logic in ihe udcial process and the inherent good that is associated with a logical
approach in litigation. He argues that if there are "inconsistencies", then history, custom or sociology
(the other forces) may step in, but in case of a perfect legal problem, logic must be adhered to."
Thereafter, he establishes a link beteen logic and impartiality. He assumes, like many other
Modernist scholars, that a logical analysis and solution to a problem is essentially impartial and
unbiased. However, in this process he ignorcs the fact that logic itself is a construct and a product of
post-enlightenment rationality. In a country like India, where several modes of analysis and
comprehension have existed and still exists (for those who have successfully resisted the aggressive
designs of the Modern), such a claim is problematic. To illustrate this, let us consider a slight variation
of the Narmada controversy.' Let us say (in a much more humane world), the government had come
up with a perfect plan for the rehabilitation of the displaced communities, by which they would not
suffer any monetary loss. Thereafter, the government gives certain "scientifically" sound reasons for
the necessity of the dam. In answer to all this the communities say that they do not want to leave
their present land for the simple fact that it was where their forefathers resided. The use of logic
cannot be considered to be impartial iI this case because it fits into the technique of analysis of the
state, while the analytical process of the communities is completely ignored, if not ridiculed. The
logic used is not impartial as it has been devised and appropriated by power, in this case, the state.
The dominant discourse around big dams and rehabilitation has used the techniques of rationality
and science." If the judge was to follow Cardozo's advice and make use of logic and rationality,
would such reasoning he "impartial"? The impartiality of logic is a myth, which helps in perpetuating
the dominant discourse. By submitting themselves to this mode of analysis, convinced of the
"inherent value" and "impartiality" of logic and rationality, the judge willingly transforms himself
into an actor who perpetuates and legitirises the dominant discourse. This was certainly relevant in
the era and context in which Cardozo operated. However, it is especially relevant to an Indian, being
aware of the multiplicity of discourses that exist around her and the inherent violence of the
Nehruvian project of forcing one parncular discourse over another. Such violence has been
committed in both the colonial and post-colonial political setup of this country and is something
which any scholar disenchanted with the Indian version of the Modernist project must be wary of
iii. Unifornity
Let us now focus on one particular sentence of Cardozos. Cardozo says that the lack of uniformity

may "raise a feeling of resentment in my (the litigant's) breast" Foucault would have been quick to
point to this quotation as an example of how power makes all of us a site of its action as well as an
actor itself. In Foucaultian terms, power is not conceived as a property or possession of the dominant
takes on even Holmes, (wha, as we have already mentioned, was a role model for Cardozo) and argues that logic
has an equally if not more important role to play alongside experience, which Holmes described as the life of law:

" Here he

SCARZO. sapm note 5, at 33.
ction of a dam on the Narmada river in the western part of India.
It was challenged by the people of the river valley who were being displaced by the project (and were not consulted in any
The Narmada controvers revolved around the consu

way) One of the grounds of challenge was That the governmen' did nor have an adequate rehabilitation plan for the vicrims. The Supreme Coun dismised the petition by a majority judgment. See, Namada Barbao Andolan a Union of Inia,
AIR. 2000 S.C. 3751,
However, the lact that they can be challenged using their very own technique is not resilya point which is relevant to this paper.
The point here is what the method of analysis in ths case favours one of the parries et the dispute
Citnozo, supr note , at 34.
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class, state or the bourgeoisie, but as a strategy; the effects of domination associated with power arise
not from an appropriation or deployment by a subject but from "maneuvers, tactics, techniques and
functioning"." A power relation does not consitute an obligation or prohibition imposed upon the
"powerless", rather it invests in them and is transmitted by and through them. in short, Foucault
conceptualises power neither as an institution nor a structure but as a "complex strategical situation"'
or a "multiplicity of force relations"." The dominant rationalist discourse (of which Cardozo is a
spokesperson) here encompasses us to such an extent that a lack of its component elements, such as
uniformity, will create "resentment" This illustrates the power of this discourse, and is something
that has to be kept in mind by anyone who wishes to challenge it.
The abovemenhtoned phrase of Cardozo' regarding the resentment arising out of the non-uniformity
of justice also illustrates the particular historical context in which Cardozo operated. Cardozo served
as a judge in a nation which purported to function on liberal capitalist principles. Due to the rather
short remembered history of the white American man, he never had to deal with a feudal structure
of justice delivery In a feudal judicial process, justice delivery is not uniform but personal and
tangible. An Indian scholar has to deal with this sort of a judicial process nor only because this was
a prevalent feature of the colonial and pre-colonial past of the nation, but since it also forms a
prominent feature of the present for a vast number of Indians. In India, justice delivery does not end
with the High Courts and the Supreme Court but extends to the Panchaysts and Gram Sabbas wx
here
village elders dispense justice. Such personalised and tangible justice is often more valued than the
impersonal and uniform kind handed our by courts. Therefore, unlike Cardozo, it is not easy for an
Indian scholar to claim that the lack of such qualities would lead to resentment in the mind of the
justice seekers.
iv. The "Mores" of the lay
I now wish to move on to the "method of sociology", which I feel is more central to Cardozo's
analysis of how a judge reaches a decision.
On the method of sociology, which later scholars have termed the greatest of his four methods in
terms of its impact, Cardoo's belief was that "(t)he final cause of law is the welfare of society""' and
he hoped that judges would always strive to shape the law in such a way as to promote "the welfare of
sociery," acting within the limits imposed by the Constitution and with respect for precedent,
traditions and history. At this early stage, the technique contemplated is a rather vague expression of
a noble intention. What I seek to do is to attempt to briefly problematise certain concepts that he
develops in the subsequent parts of the text,
MICHRL FoUCAurr, PiwR / KNowumnca: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND WarnTNs oF MICHEL FOUCAuLT 78 (C. Gordon
ad. 1980). (Hereinafter "PouCAULT").
MicH-i

FoucAuia', TiE-ARCHAEOLOGY

OF KnOWLEDoic84 (1980).

FouvcAUT sapro not 49, at S01.

to describe feudal justice delivery system. Partha Charterie uses this term in his latest
on rhe BAwssm/
3aSri case, one of the most celebrated trial cases in Indian judicial history [PART-A CHATrERJE. A
PRINCELY IMxwsTRs? TFi- KusiA or BAwAw AND THE1SEckrT flsToRY oF INDiAN NATiONAusI (2002)]. Chatteriee
states that in a feudal justice delivery system, the "justice seeker" (a better alternative for "litigant" in a feudal context) approaches the fedat master (the judge) personaly for justice She states her case personally and on ihat basis is irmnediarely
granted a deiee This systeirn may very well be arbitrary but the juialce seeker can almst "feel" the decision delivered to
her. in the impersonal court process mired in procedure and legal argon, the liugant loses all touch with the decision-maiing process, thereby aking it "intangible", ina manner of speakung.
"Tangible" is an interesting way

work
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Firstly, let us look at the argument on the "mores of the community". Throughout the course of his
argument, Cardozo refers to the "mores of the community" as if there was only one such "customary
morality developed through ages"54 available to a judge. In the context of the white heterosexual
American male within which Cardozo functioned, such a monocultural conceptualisation would have
been incorrect but would not have posed a significant problem. For an Indian reader who reconciles
several, often starkly different, moralities, such a conceptualization is not only incorrect but highly
problematic. This point can be illustrated through the case of Mohammed Abmed Khan v. Shab Bano
Begum tm In this case, judges were faced with multiple moralities. They chose the one they were
comfortable with; a liberal set of morals based on gender equality. However, the judges, as cultural
outsiders to the morals of the people affected by the case, gave a decision which, like Cardozo's
statement, was well-intentioned but highly problematic.
Cardozo did not ignore the possibility of a clash of moralities. However, he formulated the problem
in a slightly different manner. He stated that there may be occasions when the mores of the day may
conflict with the personal views and morals of the judges. His solution was simple. He felt that in the
event of a conflict, the mores of the community must prevail. "(A) judge,, I think, would err if he were
to impose upon the community as a rule of life his own idiosyncrasies of conduct or belief."' He
elaborated that a judge is "under a duty to conform to the accepted standards of the community"."
This, however, is to beg the question
how does one ascertain the accepted standards of the
community? One is inclined to believe that Cardozo was talking of a majoritarian principle, whereby
the morals of the majority are those which the judge should follow." Such a conception is highly
problematic in a country like India, with its highly sensitive democracy and its delicate structure of
somewhat unfinished nation building. It is doubtful whether our patchwork society could ever
withstand a majoritarian justice delivery process.
To his credit, Cardozo contemplated a situation where the morality of the majority on some issues
could be so contentious that the judge would not be right in following it. He addresses this issue
rather briefly: "In one field or another of acnivit practices in opposition to the sentiments and
standards of the age may grow up and threaten to intrench themselves if not dislodged. Despite their
temporary hold, they do not stand comparison with accepted norms or morals." In the absence of
greater qualification, this exception of Cardozo's reads more like an appeal to the good conscience of
the judge to exercise discretion, to pamper the views of a misguided minority

CAMozo, supra note .,

Ft72.

AIR. 1985 S.C. 945. The case involved the issue of maintenance of a Muslim widow under Muslim law A bench
comprising of -lidu JUdges radically reinterpreted existing Muslim law, including the Koran, to drastically increase the
amount of maintenance and other benefits that a divorced Muslim woman was entitled to. The decision created a furore
amongst the Muslims and the Government passed a bill in the Parliament nullifying the judgment and in the process,
worsening the sihuation of the Muslim women.
CAROozo, supra note 5, at 108.
Chusozo, slpra note 5, at 108.
Of course, even such a policy would not resolve how one might ascertain the morality of the majority of the people. This
is a question that jurists have not realy engaged with, frequent references notwithstanding This is what Professor Unger
has called a lack of will on the part of the jurisprudential scholars to engage with the problems of "democracy", which
has been dealt with in detail by political theorists. Cardoao is no exception. However, we will leave this question here at
the moment and move ahead to what he actually aldengage in.
CARDozo, supra note 5, at 109.
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The problem with the mores of the day is heightened in the Indian context where the judges
sometimes do not share the same class consciousness as the majority of the population and therefore
often have a drastically different set of moral and ethical values from that of the majority. The morr
of the day then end up becoming the mores of certain educaterd elites who have come to control
power in post-colonial India. At the risk of generalisation, one could easily point to the example of
environmental litigation in India to bear out the argument. Judges have often been sympathetic to
environment causes (like automobile pollution) which trouble the urban middle class (with whom the
iudges often share a consciousness) rather than those (like displacement caused by large processes)
which are important to the rural poor. Cardozo brushed this issue aside by saying that the different
moralities of the different judges would (mathernatically?) cancel each other out. That, once again, is
an uncharacteristically superficial answer from a man who writes with such logical rigour.
Concluding the Reading
Aeccording to Derrida, deconstruction is in itself a political act and therefore one does not need to
achieve or prove something to justify the exercise. In other words, deconstruction requires no
conclusions. However, since I did not complete the process of deconstruction and ensure the
complete free flow of the binary opposites, I believe a brief concluding remark is in order.
The process of reading shows how the dominant discourse often makes mono-cultural and unitary
claims about the judicial process. The discourses on democracy and legislation have been refined over
the past half century by post-structuralist and post colonial scholars who have argued for a more
multicultural approach. The judicial process, however, seems to have escaped such refinement-" A
judicial process prioritising notions such as "objectivity" and "uniformity" tends towards
monocultural interpretations of important issues, which leads to the suppression of marginalised
cultures- When judges become lawmakers (as even Cardozo admits they do), it is extremely important
that their treatment of issues is culturally sensitive and pluralist.
The reading also helps one to understand the power of certain popular modern myths such as logic
and truth, in the discourse around the judicial process. So powerful arc these that they effectively
mask the essentially political nature of the judicial process. This has been the core of the challenge
posed by the Critical Legal Studies movernent to the mainstream discourse. Therefore, in a scenario
where the judges need to deal with all the dilemmas of a fragmented post-modern society, it is crucial
that the judicial process be discussed along with other themes like democracy.
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